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ABSTRACT
"Buffer-stock" versions of the dynamic stochastic optimizing model of saving are now standard in
the consumption literature. This paper builds theoretical foundations for rigorous understanding of
the main characteristics of buffer stock models, including the existence of a target level of wealth
and the proposition that aggregate consumption growth equals aggregate income growth in a small








Following Friedman’s (1957) introduction of the permanent income hypothesis, a fruit-
ful period of formalization culminated in famous papers by Schectman and Escud-
ero (1977) and Bewley (1977). However, despite powerful subsequent developments in
recursive dynamic theory (codiﬁed in Stokey et. al. (1989)), surprisingly few theoret-
ical results have ever been published about the commonly used version of the model
with unbounded (constant relative risk aversion) utility, stochastic labor income, and
no liquidity constraints.
Economists working in the area have nonetheless been able to use this model ex-
tensively because increasing computer power has allowed them to solve the problem
numerically. Starting with Zeldes (1989), numerical solutions have now become the
standard approach for serious quantitative consumption modeling.
But numerical methods have a ‘black box’ character. It is possible to use a con-
sumption rule that emerges from a numerical solution algorithm without thoroughly
understanding of the properties of that rule. Indeed, without foundational theory, it
can even be diﬃcult to be sure that numerical solutions are correct. And without
theoretical underpinnings, the analyst often does not know the circumstances under
which any given simulation result might change.
A good example is the ﬁnding that when consumers are both impatient and “pru-
dent” there will be a target level of nonhuman wealth (‘cash’ for short) such that if
actual cash exceeds the target, the consumer will spend freely and cash will fall (in
expectation), while if actual cash is below the target the consumer will save and cash
will rise. Carroll (1992; 1997) showed that target saving behavior can arise under
plausible parameter values for both ﬁnite and inﬁnite horizon models. Gourinchas and
Parker (2002) estimate the model and conclude that the buﬀer-stock saving phase of
life lasts from age 25 until around age 40-45; using the same model with diﬀerent data
Cagetti (2003) ﬁnds target saving behavior into the 50s for the median household.
But none of these papers provides a formal explanation for why target saving behavior
arises. In each case, target-saving behavior is simply observed in simulations under
speciﬁc parameter values. The papers also draw a variety of other conclusions based
on the numerical solutions, such as that the marginal propensity to consume appears
to approach the perfect foresight MPC as cash gets large.
This paper provides the analytical foundations for these and other propositions
that have emerged from the simulation literature. The paper pairs these theoretical
results with illustrative simulation examples, providing an integrated framework for
understanding buﬀer-stock saving behavior.1
The paper proceeds in three parts.
The ﬁrst part states the maximization problem, demonstrates that the problem can
1The computer programs that generate these simulation results are available on the author’s
website.
2be rewritten in terms of ratios to permanent labor income, and proves that the problem
deﬁnes a contraction mapping with a limiting consumption function. It then shows
that a related class of models (exempliﬁed by Deaton (1991)) reﬂects a particular limit
of the model examined here.
The next section demonstrates ﬁve key properties of buﬀer-stock saving models.
First, as cash approaches inﬁnity the expected growth rate of consumption and the
marginal propensity to consume converge to their values in the perfect foresight case.
Second, as cash approaches zero the expected growth rate of consumption approaches
inﬁnity, and the MPC approaches a speciﬁc simple analytical limit. Third, there exists
a unique ‘target’ cash-on-hand-to-permanent-income ratio. Fourth, at the target cash
ratio, the expected growth rate of consumption is slightly less than the expected growth
rate of permanent labor income. Finally, the expected growth rate of consumption is
declining in the level of cash. All of the ﬁrst four propositions are proven generally;
the last proposition is shown to hold if there are no transitory shocks, but may fail in
extreme cases if there are both transitory and permanent shocks.
The ﬁnal section examines properties of aggregate behavior in an economy pop-
ulated by buﬀer-stock consumers. Szeidl (2002) has recently proven that an ergodic
distribution of cash will exist in such an economy.2 This section shows that even with
a ﬁxed aggregate interest rate that diﬀers from the time preference rate, the economy
converges to a balanced growth equilibrium in which the growth rate of consumption
and cash tend toward the (exogenous) growth rate of permanent income. A similar
proposition holds at the level of individual households.
2 The Problem
2.1 Setup
Consider a consumer solving an optimization problem from the current period t until









where u(C) is a constant relative risk aversion utility function u(C) = C1−ρ/(1 − ρ)
for ρ > 1.3 (We will ultimately be interested in the limit as the time until death T −t
approaches inﬁnity, but we start with a ﬁnite horizon). Initial conditions are deﬁned
2Szeidl’s proof supplants the analysis in an earlier draft of this paper, which provided simulation
evidence of ergodicity but no proof.
3The main results also hold for logarithmic utility which is the limit as ρ → 1 but dealing with
the logarithmic case is cumbersome and therefore omitted.
3by a starting value of market resources Mt (cash) and an initial value of permanent
noncapital income Pt. The consumer’s circumstances evolve according to
At = Mt − Ct,
Mt+1 = RAt + Yt+1,
Yt+1 = Pt+1ξt+1,
Pt+1 = GPtΨt+1, (2)
where At indicates the consumer’s assets at the end of period t, which grow by a
ﬁxed interest factor R = (1 + r) between periods;4 Mt+1 is the sum of beginning-of-
next-period resources RAt and next-period noncapital income Yt+1; actual noncapital
income Yt+1 equals permanent noncapital income Pt+1 multiplied by a mean-one iid
transitory shock ξt+1 (more generally, we assume that from the perspective of period t,
all future transitory shocks satisfy Et[˜ ξt+n] = 1 ∀ n ≥ 1);5 and permanent noncapital
income in period t + 1 is equal to its previous value, multiplied by a growth factor G,
and modiﬁed by a mean-one truncated lognormal iid shock Ψt+1, Et[˜ Ψt+n] = 1 ∀ n ≥ 1
satisfying Ψ ∈ [Ψ, ¯ Ψ] for 0 < Ψ ≤ 1 ≤ ¯ Ψ < ∞ where Ψ = ¯ Ψ = 1 is the degenerate case
with no permanent shocks.6
Following Carroll (1992), assume that in future periods n ≥ 1 there is a small
probability p that income will be zero (a ‘zero-income event’),
ξt+n =
(
0 with probability p > 0
Θt+1/q with probability q ≡ (1 − p)
(3)
where Θt+n is a mean-one random variable (guaranteeing Et[˜ ξt+n] = 1), and has a
distribution satisfying Θ ∈ [Θ, ¯ Θ] where 0 < Θ ≤ 1 ≤ ¯ Θ < ∞ (degenerately Θ = ¯ Θ =
1). Call the cumulative distribution functions FΨ and FΘ (and Fξ is derived trivially
from (3) and FΘ). Permanent income and cash start out strictly positive, Pt ∈ (0,∞)
and Mt ∈ (0,∞), and the consumer cannot die in debt,
CT ≤ MT. (4)
4Allowing a stochastic interest factor is straightforward but adds little to the analysis.
5The notational convention is that stochastic variables have a ∼ over them when their expec-
tation is being taken from the perspective of a period prior to their realization, but have no ∼
otherwise. Hence we write Pt+1 = GPtΨt+1 but if we need the period-t expectation we write
Et[ ˜ Pt+1] = GPtEt[˜ Ψt+1].
6The deﬁnition of permanent income here diﬀers from Deaton’s (1992) (which is often used in the
macro literature), in which permanent income is the amount that a perfect foresight consumer could
spend while leaving total (human and nonhuman) wealth constant. Relatedly, we refer to Mt as ‘cash’
rather than as wealth to avoid any confusion for those readers who might be accustomed to thinking
of the discounted value of future labor income as a part of wealth.
4The model looks more special than it is. In particular, the assumption of a posi-
tive probability of zero-income events may seem questionable. However, it is easy to
show that a model with a nonzero minimum value of ξ (because, for example, of un-
employment insurance) can be redeﬁned by capitalizing the present discounted value
of perfectly certain income into current market assets,7 transforming that model back
into the model analyzed here. Also, the assumption that there is a positive point mass
(as opposed to positive density) for the worst realization of the transitory shock is
inessential, but simpliﬁes and clariﬁes the proofs.
Combining the combinable transition equations, the recursive nature of the problem










Pt+1 = GPtΨt+1 (6)
Mt+1 = R(Mt − Ct) + Pt+1ξt+1. (7)
This model diﬀers from Bewley’s (1977) classic formulation in several ways. The
CRRA utility function does not satisfy Bewley’s assumption that u(0) is well deﬁned,
or that u0(0) is well deﬁned and ﬁnite, so neither the value function nor the marginal
value function will be bounded. It diﬀers from Schectman and Escudero (1977) in that
they impose liquidity constraints and positive minimum income. It diﬀers from both
of these formulations in that it permits permanent growth, and permanent shocks to
income, which a large empirical literature ﬁnds to be quite substantial in micro data
(MaCurdy (1982); Abowd and Card (1989); Carroll and Samwick (1997); Jappelli
and Pistaferri (2000); Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004)) and which are almost
certainly more consequential for utility than are transitory ﬂuctuations. It diﬀers from
Deaton (1991) because liquidity constraints are absent; there are separate transitory
and permanent shocks; and the transitory shocks here can occasionally cause income
to reach zero. Finally, it diﬀers from models found in Stokey et. al. (1989) because
neither constraints nor bounds on utility or marginal utility are imposed.8 Below it
will become clear that the Deaton model can be thought of as a particular limit of this
paper’s model.
7So long as this PDV is a ﬁnite number and unemployment beneﬁts are related to Pt; see the
discussion in section 2.7.
8Similar restrictions to those in the cited literature are made in the well known papers by
Scheinkman and Weiss (1986) and Clarida (1987). See Toche (2000) for an elegant analysis of a
related but simpler continuous-time model.
52.2 The Perfect Foresight Benchmark
A useful benchmark is the solution to the corresponding perfect foresight model, which
can be written as above with p = 0 and Θ = ¯ Θ = Ψ = ¯ Ψ = 1.
The dynamic budget constraint plus the can’t-die-in-debt condition imply an exactly-
holding intertemporal budget constraint
PDV t(C) = Mt − Pt + PDV t(P), (8)
and with constant growth and interest factors
PDV t(P) = Pt + (G/R)Pt + (G/R)











where Ht is ‘human wealth,’ the discounted value of future labor earnings.








which can be used similarly to obtain


























≡Wt z }| {
(Mt − Pt + Ht) (15)
where κt is the marginal propensity to consume and Wt is total wealth, human and
nonhuman.
We deﬁne the inﬁnite horizon solution as the limit of the ﬁnite horizon solution as
the horizon T − t approaches inﬁnity.9 However, (10) makes plain that in order for
limn→∞ HT−n to be ﬁnite, we must impose
G < R. (16)
9This is not necessarily the same as the solution to a truly inﬁnite horizon problem; se ignore this
subtlety.
6Intuitively, ﬁnite human wealth requires that labor income grow at a rate less than
the interest rate.
Similarly, if we start with any positive value of consumption, then in order for the
PDV of consumption to be ﬁnite we must impose
(Rβ)
1/ρ < R. (17)
Inspection of the formula for κt in (15) makes the reason for this restriction obvious:
It is necessary to guarantee a positive marginal propensity to consume. This can be
loosely thought of as imposing a maximum degree of ‘patience,’ in the sense that the
consumer cannot be so pathologically patient as to wish to spend zero or a negative
amount when Wt > 0. We will henceforth refer to this condition as ‘nonpathological
patience’ or NPP for short.
2.3 Demonstration That the Problem Can Be Rewritten in
Ratio Form
As written, the problem has two state variables, the level of permanent noncapital
income Pt and the level of market resources Mt. We show now that for relative risk
aversion ρ > 1, it is possible to normalize the model by Pt and thereby to reduce the
eﬀective number of state variables to one.10,11 Speciﬁcally, deﬁning lower-case variables
as the upper-case variable normalized by Pt (e.g. mt = Mt/Pt), assume that VT+1 = 0,
and consider the problem in the second-to-last period of life,















1−ρ + βET−1[( ˜ PT ˜ mT)
1−ρ]
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Γt ≡ GΨt (18)
10The same normalization is possible in the logarithmic utility case; the derivation is omitted for
brevity.
11This subsection reviews material that is well known in order to provide a notational and conceptual
framework for subsequent novel material.










at = mt − ct, (20)
mt+1 = Rt+1at + ξt+1 (21)
for
Rt+1 ≡ (R/Γt+1). (22)
If we specify vT(mT) = m
1−ρ





Similar logic can be applied inductively to all earlier periods, which means that if
we solve the normalized one-state-variable problem speciﬁed in (19)-(21) we will have




Ct(Mt,Pt) = Ptct(Mt/Pt), (25)
and so on.
2.4 The Baseline Solution
Figure 1 depicts the successive consumption rules that apply in the last period of life
(cT(m)), the second-to-last period, and various earlier periods under the set of baseline
parameter values listed in Table 1, which correspond to a standard calibration in the
literature.
The 45 degree line is labelled as cT(m) = m because in the last period of life it
is optimal to spend all remaining resources. The ﬁgure shows the consumption rules





2.5 Conditions Under Which the Problem Deﬁnes a Contrac-
tion Mapping
To prove that the consumption rules converge, we need to show that the problem de-
ﬁnes a contraction mapping. Unfortunately, (19) cannot be proven to be a contraction
8Table 1: Baseline Parameter Values
Description Parameter Value
Permanent Income Growth Factor G 1.03
Interest Factor R 1.04
Time Preference Factor β 0.96
Coeﬀ of Relative Risk Aversion ρ 2
Probability of Zero Income p 0.005
Std Dev of Log Permanent Shock σψ 0.1
Std Dev of Log Transitory Shock σθ 0.1
mapping using the standard theorems in, say, Stokey et. al. (1989), because those theo-
rems require marginal utility to be bounded over the space of possible values of m. For
the problem speciﬁed here, the possibility (however unlikely) of an unbroken string of
zero-income events for the remainder of life means that as m approaches zero c must
approach zero (see the discussion in 2.5.2) and thus marginal utility is unbounded.
Fortunately, Boyd (1990) provides a weighted contraction mapping theorem that can
be used. To use Boyd’s theorem we need
Deﬁnition 1 Deﬁne f ∈ C(A,B) where C(A,B) is the space of continuous functions
from A to B. Suppose φ ∈ C(A,B) with B ⊂ R and φ > 0. Then f is φ-bounded if









For Cφ (A,B) deﬁned as the set of functions in C(A,B) that are φ-bounded,
Boyd (1990) proves the following.
Boyd’s Weighted Contraction Mapping Theorem. Let T : Cφ (A,B) →
C (A,B) such that
1) T is non-decreasing, i.e. wa(m) ≤ wb(m) ⇒ (T wa)(m) ≤ (T wb)(m)
2) T (0) ∈ Cφ (A,B)
3) T (w + γφ) ≤ T w + γςφ for some ς < 1 and all γ > 0. (28)
Then T is a contraction with a unique ﬁxed point.
For our problem, take A as R++, B as R and φ(m) = η+m+m1−ρ where η > 0 is
a real number whose speciﬁc value will be determined in the course of the proof. We


















Figure 1: Convergence of the Consumption Rules
where mt+1 is deﬁned as in (21) and















where κ and ¯ ¯ κ can be referred to respectively as the ‘minimal’ and the ‘maximal’
marginal propensies to consume (these terms will be justiﬁed later, along with the
notation).
Our goal is to show that T satisﬁes the conditions that Boyd requires of his operator
T , if we impose two restrictions on parameter values.
The ﬁrst restriction is the nonpathological patience requirement imposed for the
perfect foresight model, (17). The second is
RβE[˜ Γ
−ρ] < 1, (32)
which is identical to the condition Deaton (1991) showed necessary for his model with








We discuss the meaning of these restrictions in detail below; essentially, they require
the consumer to be suﬃently impatient so that desired m does not head to inﬁnity.
We are now in position to state the main theorem of the paper.
10Theorem 1 The mapping T is a contraction mapping if the restrictions on parameter
values (17) and (32) are true. Furthermore, Tvt+1(m) = vt(m), which means the
mapping T generates the sequence of value functions deﬁned in equation (19).
2.5.1 Proof that T Is A Contraction Mapping
We must show that our operator T satisﬁes all of Boyd’s conditions.
Boyd’s operator T maps from Cφ(A,B) to C(A,B). A preliminary requirement is
therefore that Tw be continuous for any φ−bounded w, Tw ∈ C(R++,R). This is not
diﬃcult to show; see Hiraguchi (2003) for details.




















so wa ≤ wb implies Twa ≤ Twb by inspection.12












the solution to which is patently u(¯ ¯ κmt). Hence T(0) is φ-bounded for φ(m) = η +
m + m1−ρ.13
Finally, we turn to Boyd’s condition 3), T(w + γφ) ≤ Tw + γςφ. We begin by
constructing the T(φ) term. Expand the expectation βEt[˜ Γ
1−ρ




































12Recall that ˜ mt+1 is just a function of ct and the stochastic shocks.
13Note that T(0) is not vT; this maximization does not have an economic interpretation.



















Rat + ˜ Γt+1˜ ξt+1
￿1−ρ￿








Rat + ˜ Γt+1˜ Θt+1
￿1−ρ￿￿











where the last line follows from comparing the two components on each side of the
inequality separately: For the second component, with ρ > 1, Θ
1−ρ ≥ Et[(Rat +
˜ Θt+1)1−ρ], while for the ﬁrst component, if Ψ were distributed as an untruncated
lognormal we would have
Et[˜ Ψ
1−ρ
t+1] = exp(−(1 − ρ)σ
2






























Note that the impatience condition (32) implies that the ﬁrst term on the RHS of
(38) can be rewritten
(η + ¯ Θ)RβEt[˜ Γ
−ρ
t+1](G/R) < (η + ¯ Θ)(G/R). (43)
This condition also implies that the ﬁrst term on the RHS in (36) is less than mt.
On the other hand, at satisﬁes at = mt − ct ≥ λmt for all t where λ = (1 − ¯ ¯ κ) is







which implies that the term (Rat)1−ρ in (38) is less than R1−ρλ
1−ρm
1−ρ
t . Using this
and (43), the RHS of (38) is less than


















14Mnemonic: λ is the Greek letter l and the amount left unspent.

















Under the assumptions on parameters above, there exist η > 0 and ς ∈ (0,1) which
satisfy
(η + ¯ Θ)(G/R) + βq(GΘ)
1−ρEt[˜ Ψ
1−ρ




t+1] ≤ ς (48)
βp(Rλ)
1−ρ ≤ ς. (49)








t+1] + RβEt[˜ Γ
−ρ












t+1(w(˜ mt+1) + γφ(˜ mt+1))
i
(51)

































t+1 deﬁned analogously to (21), then we obtain our ﬁnal requirement:












































= T(w) + γςφ






≤ γςφ(mt) for all mt ∈
R++ and mt+1 such that ct ∈ [κmt,¯ ¯ κmt].
Thus, the proof that T deﬁnes a contraction mapping is complete.
132.5.2 Existence of a Concave Consumption Function
We now show that the maximization problem (19) deﬁnes a sequence of continuously
diﬀerentiable strictly increasing concave functions {cT,cT−1,...,cT−k}.
To do this, we need a deﬁnition. We will say that a function n(z) is ‘nice’ if it
satisﬁes
1. n(z) is well-deﬁned iﬀ z > 0
2. n(z) is strictly increasing
3. n(z) is strictly concave
4. n(z) is C3 (its ﬁrst three derivatives exist)
5. n(z) < 0
6. limz↓0 n(z) = −∞
(Notice that an implication of niceness is that limz↓0 n0(z) = ∞.)
Assume that some vt+1 is nice. Our objective is to show that this implies vt is also
nice; this is suﬃcient to establish that vs is nice by induction for all s ≤ T because
vT(m) = u(m) and u(m) is nice by inspection for our u(c).





t+1vt+1( ˜ Rt+1a + ˜ ξt+1)
i
. (53)
Since there is a positive probability that ξt+1 will attain its minimum of zero and
since Rt+1 > 0, it is clear that lima↓0 vt(a) = −∞ and lima↓0 v0
t(a) = ∞. So vt(a)
is well-deﬁned iﬀ a > 0; it is similarly straightforward to show the other properties
required for vt(a) to be nice. (See Hiraguchi (2003)).
Next deﬁne vt(m,c) as
vt(m,c) = u(c) + vt(m − c) (54)
which is C3 since vt and u are both C3, and note that our problem’s value function




vt is well-deﬁned only if 0 < c < m. Furthermore, limc↓0 vt(m,c) = limc↑m vt(m,c) =
−∞,
∂2vt(m,c)
∂c2 < 0, limc↓0
∂vt(m,c)
∂c = +∞, and limc↑m
∂vt(m,c)









t(m − ct(m)). (57)
14Since both u and vt are strictly concave, both ct(m) and at(m) = m − ct(m) are
strictly increasing. Since both u and vt(m) are three times continuously diﬀerentiable,









Similarly we can easily show that ct(m) is twice continuously diﬀerentiable (as is
at(m)).15 This implies that vt(m) is nice, since vt(m) = u(ct(m)) + vt(at(m)).
Finally, strict concavity of the consumption functions is shown by Carroll and
Kimball (1996).
In intuitive terms, the reason ct(m) < m is that if the consumer spent all available
resources, he would arrive in period t + 1 with assets of zero, then might earn zero
noncapital income for the rest of his life (an unbroken series of zero-income events is
unlikely but possible). In such a case, the budget constraint and the can’t-die-in-debt
condition mean that the consumer would be forced to spend zero, incurring negative
inﬁnite utility. To avoid this disaster, the consumer never spends everything.
2.5.3 T generates {vT−n+1(m)}
∞
n=1
Here we show that our operator T produces the sequence of value functions deﬁned
in (19); that is, Tvt+1 = vt. The only diﬀerences between vt as deﬁned in (19) and
Tvt+1 are 1) the restriction, for the T operator, that ct ∈ [κmt, ¯ ¯ κmt], and, 2) the use
of the sup operator in the deﬁnition of T as opposed to max for vt. We show here that
these diﬀerences do not matter.
The ﬁrst step is to show that the lower bound for consumption is
ct(m) ≥ c(m) ≡ κm (59)
where κ is deﬁned by (31).
To see that this holds, deﬁne ~ ct(m) as the solution to the normalized version of the
perfect foresight ﬁnite horizon problem,
~ ct(mt) = (mt − 1 + ht)κt (60)
and note from the deﬁnition of κt, (15), that
κT−n−1 < κT−n (61)
so that limn→∞κT−n = κ < κt.
15See Appendix A.
15Furthermore, Carroll and Kimball (1996) show, in ﬁnite horizon models of the class
considered here, that the MPC for a consumer facing uncertainty is strictly greater
than the MPC for the corresponding perfect foresight consumer:
c
0
T−n(m) > κT−n. (62)
Combining these, we have
c
0
t(m) > κt > κ (63)
which justiﬁes our earlier labeling of κ as the ‘minimal’ marginal propensity to con-
sume. Since limm↓0 ct(m) = 0 the fact that κ is the lower bound MPC implies
ct(m) > κm (64)
as required for all t < T and m > 0.
The next step is to show that
ct(m) ≤ ¯ ¯ κm for all t ≤ T − 1 (65)
where ¯ ¯ κ is deﬁned by (30). Begin by deﬁning
et(m) = ct(m)/m (66)
¯ κt = lim
m↓0
et(m) > 0 (67)
and note that this limit exists and is strictly positive because continuous diﬀerentiabil-
ity and strict concavity of ct(m) along with ct(m) > 0 imply that et(m) is continuous,
decreasing, and 0 < et(m) < 1 for t < T.




































but note that since limm↓0 at(m) = 0 the limit of the double integral in (71) tends
toward bounds deﬁned by (et+1(Θ/q)Θ/q)−ρ and (et+1(¯ Θ/q)¯ Θ/q)−ρ both of which are
16ﬁnite numbers, implying that the whole term multiplied by q goes to zero as m
ρ
t goes
to zero. The integral in the other term goes to ¯ κ
−ρ
t+1(1−¯ κt)−ρ. It follows that ¯ κt satisﬁes
(¯ κt)−ρ = βpR1−ρ(¯ κt+1)−ρ(1 − ¯ κt)−ρ. We can conclude that
¯ κt = (βpR)
− 1






¯ κt = (1 − ¯ κt)¯ κt+1 (73)
which implies
(λ¯ κt)




















n=1 is an increasing convergent sequence if
0 ≤ λ < 1 (77)
0 ≤ p1/ρR−1(Rβ)1/ρ < 1 (78)
but since 0 ≤ p ≤ 1 by the deﬁnition of probability, this is a weaker condition than
R−1(Rβ)1/ρ < 1 which is the nonpathological patience condition (17) already imposed.






= ¯ ¯ κ (79)
and since ¯ κT−n is a decreasing sequence we have ¯ κT−n < ¯ ¯ κ for n > 1, justifying our
earlier labeling of ¯ ¯ κ as the maximal MPC.
The foregoing analysis permits us to conclude that the solution to our original











The only diﬀerence between (80) and Tvt+1 is the use of the max rather than
the sup operator in (80). But the u(c) and Et+1[˜ Γ
1−ρ
t+1vt+1( ˜ Rt+1(m − c) + ˜ Γt+1˜ ξt+1)]
functions are both continuous in c, and the sup of a sum of continuous functions over
a bounded compact set is a max in that set, so we can replace the sup operator with
a max operator without loss of generality. Thus, vt is equivalent to Tvt+1 as required.
2.5.4 Convergence of Consumption Functions
Application of Boyd’s theorem demonstrates that the the vt−n functions converge in
a φ−bounded space. What we are really interested in, however, is convergence of
the consumption policy functions. The proof that the former implies the latter is
uninteresting and is relegated to appendices B and C.
172.6 Liquidity Constraints as a Limit
This section demonstrates that a related problem commonly considered in the liter-
ature (e.g. by Deaton (1991)), with a liquidity constraint and a positive minimum
value of income, is the limit of the model considered here as the probability p of the
zero-income event approaches zero.
Formally, suppose we change the description of the problem by making the following
two assumptions:
p = 0 (81)
ct ≤ mt, (82)
and suppose we designate the solution to this consumer’s problem ` ct(mt). We will
henceforth refer to this as the problem of the ‘restrained’ consumer (and, to avoid a
common confusion, we will refer to the consumer as ‘constrained’ only in circumstances
when the constraint is actually binding).
Redesignate the consumption function that emerges from our original problem for a
given ﬁxed p as ct(mt;p) where we separate the arguments by a semicolon to distinguish




ct(mt;p) = ` ct(mt). (83)
We will ﬁrst examine the problem in period T − 1, then argue that the key result
propagates to earlier periods. For simplicity, suppose that the interest, growth, and
time-preference factors are R = β = G = 1, and there are no permanent shocks, Ψ = 1;
the results below are easily generalized to the full-ﬂedged version of the problem.
The solution to the restrained consumer’s optimization problem can be obtained
as follows. Assuming that the consumer’s behavior in period T is given by cT(mT) (in












As usual, the envelope theorem tells us that v0
T(m) = u0(cT(m)) so the expected







0(cT(a + Θ))dFΘ, (85)
and the solution to (84) will satisfy
u




T−1(m) as the function that solves (86), ` a∗
T−1(m) answers the question
“With what level of assets would the restrained consumer like to end period T − 1
if the constraint cT−1 ≥ mT−1 did not exist?” (Note that the restrained consumer’s
income process remains diﬀerent from the process for the unrestrained consumer so
long as p > 0). The restrained consumer’s actual asset position will be
` aT−1(m) = min[0,` a
∗
T−1(m)], (87)
reﬂecting the inability of the restrained consumer to spend more than current resources,









is the cusp value of m at which the constraint makes the transition from binding to
not binding.
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with solution aT−1(m;p). Now note that for a ﬁxed a > 0, limp↓0 v0
T−1(a;p) =
` v0
T−1(a). Since the LHS of (86) and (90) are identical, this means that for such an m
limp↓0 aT−1(m;p) = ` a∗
T−1(m). That is, for any ﬁxed value of m > m
#
T−1 such that the
consumer subject to the restraint would voluntarily choose to end the period with pos-
itive assets, the level of end-of-period assets for the unrestrained consumer approaches
the level for the restrained consumer as p ↓ 0. With the same a and the same m, the
consumers must have the same c, so the consumption functions are identical in the
limit.
Now consider values m ≤ m
#
T−1 for which the restrained consumer is constrained.
It is obvious that the baseline consumer will never choose a ≤ 0 because the ﬁrst
term in in (89) is lima↓0 pa−ρ = ∞, while lima↓0(m − a)−ρ is ﬁnite (the marginal value
of end-of-period assets approaches inﬁnity as assets approach zero, but the marginal
utility of consumption has a ﬁnite limit for m > 0). The subtler question is whether
it is possible to rule out strictly positive a for the unrestrained consumer.
The answer is yes. Suppose, for some m < m#, that the unrestrained consumer
is considering ending the period with any positive amount of assets a = δ > 0. For
any such δ we have that limp↓0 v0
T−1(a;p) = ` v0
T−1(a). But by assumption we are
considering a set of circumstances in which ` a∗
T−1(m) < 0, and we showed earlier that
19limp↓0 a∗
T−1(m;p) = ` a∗
T−1(m). So, having assumed a = δ > 0, we have proven that the
consumer would optimally choose a < 0, which is a contradiction. A similar argument
holds for m = m
#
T−1.
These arguments demonstrate that for any m > 0, limp↓0 cT−1(m;p) = ` cT−1(m)
which is the period T − 1 version of (83). But given equality of the period T − 1
consumption functions, backwards recursion of the same arguments demonstrates that
the limiting consumption functions in previous periods are also identical in the limit,
so (83) holds.
Note ﬁnally that another intuitive conﬁrmation of the equivalence between the two




¯ κ = 1, (91)
which makes sense because the marginal propsensity to consume for a constrained
restrained consumer is one by the deﬁnition of ‘constrained.’
2.7 Discussion of Conditions Required for Convergence
For the proof to hold we needed to impose two parametric conditions, (32) and (17).
To understand these conditions, consider a comparison to the inﬁnite horizon perfect
foresight problem.
Both problems impose the nonpathological patience condition, (17). Surprisingly,
however, our other restriction, (32), can actually be weaker than the second condition
required for the perfect foresight problem, G < R. To see this, raise both sides of (32)





￿−1/ρ < G (92)
and note that if we turn oﬀ the permanent shocks Ψ = ¯ Ψ = 1 this reduces to
(Rβ)
1/ρ < G. (93)
A particularly transparent case is R = 1 and G ≥ 1. Human wealth is inﬁnite so
the perfect foresight inﬁnite horizon model has no solution, but if β < 1 our model
does have a solution.
To help interpret our condition, consider an inﬁnite horizon perfect foresight con-
sumer who does satisfy G < R and who arrives in period t with beginning-of-period
resources of zero, so that he has only human wealth. If initial permanent income is Pt







20so the condition (Rβ)1/ρ < G guarantees that consumption will exceed labor income
of Pt. Thus, this consumer is ‘impatient’ in the sense of wanting to borrow against
future labor income to ﬁnance current consumption.
The presence of permanent shocks tightens the restriction, since if Ψ is nondegen-
erate then E[Ψ−ρ]−1/ρ > 1. The interpretation of this eﬀect is simple: The presence of
uncertainty in permanent income increases the consumer’s precautionary saving mo-
tive, and therefore increases the degree of patience; the condition requires that even
after this boost to the saving motive, the consumer remains impatient in the relevant
sense.
The simplest intuition for why our model has a solution when G > R comes from
the essential equivalence between the precautionary saving motive and liquidity con-
straints. Consider a version of the perfect foresight model with liquidity constraints.
This model does have a well deﬁned solution for G > R because even a consumer with
considerable current resources cannot spend an inﬁnite amount (even if the PDV of fu-
ture labor income is inﬁnite) because that would violate the constraint. Furthermore,
the amount the consumer is willing to spend today is limited by the knowledge that,
because of impatience, they will be constrained at some point in the future.
The precautionary motive induced by the labor income risk can be thought of
as being like a smoothed version of liquidity constraints. As cash declines toward
zero, the size of the risk relative to the size of cash increases, which means that the
relative variation in consumption increases, which means that the intensity of the
precautionary motive increases. For a more rigorous and detailed treatment of the
relationship between precautionary saving and liquidity constraints, see Carroll and
Kimball (2001).
3 Analysis of the Converged Consumption Func-
tion
Figures 2 and 3a,b capture the main properties of the converged consumption rule.16
Figure 2 shows the expected consumption growth factor Et[ ˜ Ct+1/Ct] for a consumer
using the converged consumption rule, while Figures 3a,b illustrate theoretical bounds
for the consumption function and the marginal propensity to consume.
I will demonstrate ﬁve features of behavior captured, or suggested, by the ﬁgures.
First, as mt → ∞ the expected consumption growth factor goes to (Rβ)1/ρ, indicated
by the lower bound in ﬁgure 2, and the marginal propensity to consume approaches
κ = (1 − R−1(Rβ)1/ρ) (ﬁgure 3), the same as in the perfect foresight case. Second,
as mt → 0 the consumption growth factor approaches ∞ (ﬁgure 2) and the MPC
approaches ¯ κ = (1 − R−1(Rβp)1/ρ) (ﬁgure 3). Third (ﬁgure 2), there is a target










Figure 2: Target Saving, Expected Consumption Growth, and Permanent Income
Growth
cash-on-hand-to-income ratio m∗ such that if mt = m∗ then Et[˜ mt+1] = mt, and (as
indicated by the arrows of motion on the Et[ ˜ Ct+1/Ct] curve) that target ratio is stable
in the sense that if mt < m∗ then cash-on-hand will rise (in expectation), while if
mt > m∗ then above the target, it will fall (in expectation). Fourth (ﬁgure 2), at the
target m, the expected growth rate of consumption is less than the expected growth
rate of permanent labor income. The ﬁnal proposition suggested by ﬁgure 2 is that
the expected consumption growth factor is declining in the level of the cash-on-hand
ratio mt. This turns out to be true in the absence of permanent shocks, but in extreme
cases it can be false if permanent shocks are present.
Throughout the remaining analysis I make a ﬁnal assumption that is not strictly
justiﬁed by the foregoing. From Carroll and Kimball (1996) we know that the ﬁnite-
horizon consumption functions cT−n(m) are twice continuously diﬀerentiable and strictly
concave, and we have shown above that these converge to a continuous function c(m).
It does not follow that c(m) is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, but I will assume that
it is.
223.1 Limits as mt → ∞
Recall our deﬁnition of
c(m) = κm (95)
in (59) which is the solution to an inﬁnite-horizon problem with no labor income
(ξt = 0 ∀ t); clearly c(m) < c(m), since allowing the possibility of future labor income
cannot reduce current consumption.
Assume that G < R so that the inﬁnite horizon perfect foresight solution,
~ c(m) = (m − 1 + h)κ, (96)
exists. (We discuss the G ≥ R case below). This constitutes an upper bound on
consumption in the presence of uncertainty, since Carroll and Kimball (1996) show
that the introduction of uncertainty strictly decreases the level of consumption at any
m.
Thus, we can write
c(m) < c(m) < ~ c(m) (97)




~ c(m)/c(m) = lim
m→∞
(m − 1 + h)/m (99)
= 1. (100)
Hence, as m → ∞,c(m)/c(m) → 1, and the continuous diﬀerentiability and strict




0(m) = ~ c
0(m) = κ (101)
because any other ﬁxed limit would eventually lead to a level of consumption either
exceeding ~ c(m) or lower than c(m).
Figure 3 conﬁrms these limits visually. The top plot shows the converged consump-
tion function along with its upper and lower bounds, while the lower plot shows the
marginal propensity to consume.
Next we establish the limit of the expected consumption growth factor as mt → ∞:
lim
mt→∞
Et[ ˜ Ct+1/Ct] = lim
mt→∞
Et[˜ Γt+1˜ ct+1/ct]. (102)
But
lim
mt→∞Γt+1c(mt+1)/~ c(mt) = lim
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because limmt→∞ a0(m) = R−1(Rβ)1/ρ and Γt+1ξt+1/mt ≤ (G¯ Ψ¯ Θ/q)/mt which goes to





Et[ ˜ Ct+1/Ct] ≤ (Rβ)
1/ρ (106)
so as cash goes to inﬁnity, consumption growth approaches its value in the perfect
foresight model.
This argument applies equally well to the problem of the restrained consumer,
because as m approaches inﬁnity the constraint becomes irrelevant.
Of course, the constraint never becomes irrelevant if human wealth is inﬁnite. We
ruled out inﬁnite human wealth at the beginning of this section by assuming R > G.
We now consider the case where R ≤ G.
Think ﬁrst about the perfect foresight model with constraints. With inﬁnite human
wealth the constraint never becomes irrelevant, but the date at which it binds recedes
arbitrarily far in the future as nonhuman approaches inﬁnity. Between the present and
that receding date, the optimal growth rate of consumption approaches (Rβ)1/ρ, which
in turn implies that the marginal propensity to consume approaches the same limit
as before, (1 − R−1(Rβ)1/ρ). (For further discussion of the perfect foresight liquidity
constrained case see Carroll and Kimball (2001)).
We argued earlier, however, that consumption of the perfect foresight liquidity
constrained consumer is an upper bound to consumption of our consumers, which
implies again that the marginal propensity to consume approaches κ as m approaches
inﬁnity; thus the above arguments continue to go through.
3.2 Limits as mt → 0
Now consider the limits of behavior as mt gets arbitrarily small.
Equation (75) implies that the limiting value of ¯ κ is
¯ κ = 1 − R
−1(pRβ)
1/ρ. (107)
Deﬁning e(m) = c(m)/m as before we have
lim
m↓0
e(m) = (1 − p
1/ρR
−1(Rβ)









0(m) − c(m)/m (110)
c
0(m) = e(m) + me
0(m) (111)
and using the continuous diﬀerentiability of the consumption function along with 0 <






e(m) = ¯ κ. (112)
Figure 3 conﬁrms that standard simulation methods obtain this limit for the MPC
as m approaches zero.






























where the last line follows because the minimum possible realization of ξt+1 is Θ > 0
so the minimum possible value of expected next-period consumption is positive.
The same arguments establish limm↓0 Et[Ct+1/Ct] = ∞ for the problem of the
restrained consumer.
3.3 There exists exactly one target cash-on-hand ratio, which
is stable
Deﬁne the target cash-on-hand-to-income ratio m∗ as the value of m such that
Et[˜ mt+1/mt] = 1 if mt = m
∗. (115)
We prove existence by noting that Et[˜ mt+1/mt] is continuous on mt > 0, and takes
on values both above and below 1.
Speciﬁcally, the same logic used in section 3.2 shows that limmt↓0 Et[˜ mt+1/mt] = ∞.
The limit as mt goes to inﬁnity is
lim
mt→∞













26and appendix D shows that
Et[(Rβ)
1/ρ/˜ Γt+1] < 1 (119)
under our assumptions.
Stability means that in a local neighborhood of m∗, values of mt above m∗ will result
in a smaller ratio of Et[˜ mt+1/mt] than at m∗. That is, if mt > m∗ then Et[mt+1/mt] <





Et[˜ mt+1/mt] < 0 (120)


















which will be negative if its numerator is negative. Deﬁne ν(mt) as the expectation of
the numerator,
ν(mt) = Et[ ˜ Rt+1](c(mt) − c
0(mt)mt) − 1. (121)
Now consider the deﬁnition of the target level of cash m∗ such that Et[˜ mt+1] =
mt = m∗:
Et[˜ mt+1] = Et[ ˜ Rt+1(mt − ct) + ˜ ξt+1] (122)
m
∗ = Et[ ˜ Rt+1](m
∗ − c(m
∗)) + 1 (123)
Et[ ˜ Rt+1]c(m
∗) = 1 − (1 − Et[ ˜ Rt+1])m
∗. (124)
At the target, equation (121) is
ν(m
∗) = Et[ ˜ Rt+1]c(m
∗) − Et[ ˜ Rt+1]c
0(m
∗)m
∗ − 1. (125)
27Substituting for the ﬁrst term in this expression using (124) gives
ν(m
∗) = 1 − (1 − Et[ ˜ Rt+1])m
∗ − Et[ ˜ Rt+1]c
0(m
∗)m














































We have now proven that some target m∗ must exist, and that at any such m∗ the
solution is stable. Nothing we have said so far, however, rules out the possibility that
there will be multiple values of m that satisfy the deﬁnition (115) of a target.
Multiple targets can be ruled out as follows. Suppose there exist multiple targets,
indexed by i, so that the target with the smallest value is m∗,1. The argument just
completed implies that since Et[˜ mt+1/mt] is continuously diﬀerentiable there must exist
some small ￿ such that Et[˜ mt+1/mt] < 1 for mt = m∗,1+￿. (Continuous diﬀerentiability
of Et[˜ mt+1/mt] follows from the continous diﬀerentiability of c(mt)).
Now assume there exists a second value of m satisfying the deﬁnition of a target,
m∗,2. Since Et[˜ mt+1/mt] is continuous, it must be approaching 1 from below as mt →
m∗,2, since by the intermediate value theorem it could not have gone above 1 between
m∗,1+￿ and m∗,2 without passing through 1, and by the deﬁnition of m∗,2 it cannot have
passed through 1 before reaching m∗,2. But saying that Et[˜ mt+1/mt] is approaching 1





Et[˜ mt+1/mt] > 0 (133)
at mt = m∗,2. However, we just showed above that precisely the opposite of equation
(133) holds for any m that satisﬁes the deﬁnition of a target. Thus, assuming the
existence of more than one target implies a contradiction, and so there must be only
one target m∗.
The foregoing arguments rely on the continuous diﬀerentiability of c(m), so the
arguments do not directly go through for the restrained consumer’s problem in which
the existence of liquidity constraints can lead to discrete changes in the slope c0(m) at
particular values of m. But we can use the fact that the restrained model is the limit
28of the baseline model as p ↓ 0 to conclude that there must be a unique target cash
level in the restrained model.
If consumers are suﬃciently impatient, however, the target level in the restrained
model will be m∗ = Et[˜ ξt+1] = 1. That is, if a consumer starting with m = 1 will
save nothing, a(1) = 0, then the target level of m in the restrained model will be 1;
if a consumer with m = 1 would choose to save something, then the target level of
cash-on-hand will be greater than the expected level of income.
3.4 Expected consumption growth at target m is less than
expected permanent income growth
In ﬁgure 2 the intersection of the target cash-on-hand ratio locus at m∗ with the
expected consumption growth curve lies below the intersection with the horizontal
line representing the expected growth rate of permanent income. This can be proven
as follows.



















































and since mt+1 = (R/Γt+1)a(m∗)+ξt+1 and a(m∗) > 0 it is clear that covt(˜ Γt+1, ˜ mt+1) <
0 which implies that the entire term added to G in (137) is negative, as required.
3.5 Expected consumption growth is a declining function of
mt (or is it?)
Figure 2 depicts the expected consumption growth factor as a strictly declining function
of the cash-on-hand ratio. To investigate this, deﬁne
Υ = Ct+1/Ct (138)
= Γt+1c(Rt+1a(mt) + ξt+1)/c(mt) (139)
29and the proposition in which we are interested is
(d/dmt)E[Υ] < 0. (140)
Now deﬁne
Υ







and note that we can diﬀerentiate through the expectations operator so (140) is equiv-
alent to
E[Υ
0] < 0. (143)
Henceforth indicating appropriate arguments by the corresponding subscript (e.g.
c0
































but since Υ > 0 we can see from (149) that (143) is equivalent to
cov(Υ
−ρ−1,Υ
0) > 0 (150)








tΥ) > 0 (151)




t+1) > 0 (152)
and
cov(Υ
−ρ−1,Υ) < 0. (153)








where recall that mt+1 = (R/GΨt+1)at + ξt+1.
The two shocks cause two kinds of variation in mt+1. Variations due to ξt+1 satisfy
the proposition, since a higher draw of ξ both reduces c
−ρ−1
t+1 and reduces the marginal
propensity to consume. However, permanent shocks have conﬂicting eﬀects. On the




t+1. On the other hand, the c
−ρ−1
t+1 term is multiplied by GΨt+1, so the eﬀect of a
higher Ψt+1 could be to decrease the ﬁrst term in the covariance, leading to a negative
covariance with the second term.
I have constructed an example in which this perverse eﬀect dominates. However,
extreme assumptions were required (p < 0.000000001, very small transitory shocks)
and the region in which Υ0 > 0 was tiny. In practice, for plausible parametric choices,
E[Υ0] < 0 should generally hold.
4 The Aggregate and Idiosyncratic Relationship Be-
tween Consumption Growth and Income Growth
This section examines the behavior of large collections of buﬀer-stock consumers with
identical parameter values. Such a collection can be thought of as either a subset of the
population within a single country (say, members of a given education or occupation
group), or as the whole population in a small open economy (we will continue to take
the aggregate interest rate as exogenous and constant). It is also possible, though
more diﬃcult, to solve a closed-economy version of the model where the interest rate
is endogenous; see Carroll (2000) for an example.
Formally, we assume a continuum of ex ante identical households on the unit inter-
val, with constant total mass normalized to one and indexed by i ∈ [0,1], all behaving
according to the model speciﬁed above.
4.1 Convergence of the Cross-Section Distribution
A recent paper by Szeidl (2002) proves that such a population will be characterized
by an ergodic (invariant) distribution of m which induces invariant distributions for c
and a; designate these Fm, Fa, and Fc. (Szeidl’s proof supplants simulation evidence
of ergodicity that appeared in an earlier version of this paper).
The proof of convergence does not yield any sense of how quickly convergence
occurs, which in principle depends on all of the parameters of the model as well as
the initial conditions. To build intuition, Figure 4 supplies an example in which a
31population begins with a particularly simple distribution that is far from the ergodic
one:
mi,1 = ξi,1, (154)
which would characterize a population in which all assets had been wiped out imme-
diately before the receipt of period 1’s labor income. The ﬁgure plots the distributions
of a (for technical reasons, this is slightly better than plotting m) at the ends of 1, 4,
10, and 40 periods.
















Figure 4: Convergence of Fa to Invariant Distribution
As the ﬁgure indicates, under these parameter values convergence of the CDF to
the invariant distribution has largely been accomplished within 10 periods. By 40
periods, the distribution is indistinguishable from the invariant distribution.
4.2 Consumption and Income Growth at the Household Level
It is useful to deﬁne the operator Et {} which yields the mean value of its argument in
the population, as distinct from the expectations operator represents beliefs about the
future.
32An economist with a microeconomic dataset could calculate the average growth
rate of idiosyncratic consumption, and would ﬁnd
E {∆logCi,t+1} = E {logci,t+1Pi,t+1 − logci,tPi,t}
= E {logPi,t+1 − logPi,t + logci,t+1 − logci,t}
= E {logPi,t+1 − logPi,t} + E {logci,t+1 − logci,t}
= g − σ
2
ψ/2, (155)
where the last equality follows because the invariance of Fc means that E {logci,t+1} =
E {logci,t}.
Papers in the simulation literature have observed an approximate equivalence be-
tween the average growth rates of idiosyncratic consumption and permanent income,
but formal proof was not possible until Szeidl’s proof of ergodicity.
4.3 Growth Rates of Aggregate Income and Consumption
Attanasio and Weber (1995) point out that nonlinearities in consumption models make
it important to distinguish between the growth rate of average consumption and the
average growth rate of consumption. We have just examined the average growth rate;
it is now time to examine the growth rate of the average.
Let bold varibles designate the average and aggregate values of variables. The










= GE {Pi,t}/E {Pi,t} (157)
= G (158)
because of the independence assumptions we have made about ξ and Ψ.
Aggregate assets are:
At = E {ai,tPi,t}
= aPt + cov(ai,t,Pi,t) (159)
where we are assuming that a in period t was distributed according to the invariant
distribution which justiﬁes the lack of a time subscript on a. Since permanent income
grows at mean rate G while the distribution of a is invariant, if we normalize Pt to
one we will similarly have for any period n ≥ 1
At+1 = aG
n + cov(ai,t+n,Pi,t+n). (160)
Unfortunately, the proof of the invariance of Fa does not yield the required infor-
mation about how the covariance between a and P evolves.
33We can show the desired result if there are no permanent shocks. Suppose the
population starts in period t with an arbitrary value for cov(ai,t,Pi,t). Then if we
deﬁne




0(z + 1)dz (161)
we can write




ˆ a(Rai,t + (ξi,t+1 − 1)),GPi,t
￿
(163)
= cov(ˆ a(Rai,t),Pi,t) (164)
which holds because ξi,t+1 is a mean one variable independent of Pi,t. But since
R−1(pRβ)1/ρ < ˆ a0(m) < R−1(Rβ)1/ρ
cov((pRβ)
1/ρai,t,Pi,t) < cov(ai,t+1,Pi,t+1) < cov((Rβ)
1/ρai,t,Pi,t) (165)
and for the version of the model with no permanent shocks we know that (Rβ)1/ρ < G,
which implies
cov(ai,t+1,Pi,t+1) < Gcov(ai,t,Pi,t). (166)
This means that from any arbitrary starting value, the relative size of the covariance
term shrinks to zero over time (compared to the aGn term which is growing steadily
at rate G). Thus, limn→∞ At+n+1/At+n = G.
This logic unfortunately does not go through when there are permanent shocks,
because the Ri,t+1 terms are not independent of the permanent income shocks.
To see the problem clearly, deﬁne ¯ R = E {Ri,t+1} and consider a second order
Taylor expansion of ˆ a(Ri,t+1ai,t) around ¯ Rai,t,
ˆ ai,t+1 ≈ ˆ a( ¯ Rai,t) + ˆ a
0( ¯ Rai,t)(Ri,t+1 − ¯ R)ai,t + ˆ a
00( ¯ Rai,t)
￿




The problem comes from the ˆ a00 term. The concavity of the consumption function
implies convexity of the ˆ a function, so this term is strictly positive but we have no
theory to place bounds on its size as we do for ˆ a0. Intuitively, a large positive shock to
permanent income will produce a low ratio of assets to permanent income, which will
be associated with a low marginal propensity to save (a high MPC).
It is possible that methods like those developed by Szeidl (2002) might be able
to establish the long run properties of the covariance term, and thus verify or refute
34the proposition that the economy heads towards a balanced growth path from any
starting position. In the absence of such a proof, we must rely on simulation evidence.
In practice, a wide range of simulations ﬁnds that the inﬂuence of the covariance term
is modest. An example is given in Figure 5, which plots Ct+1/Ct for the economy for
which the CDFs were depicted in 4.
As an experiment, after the 40 periods of simulation that generated CDFs plotted
in 4, we reset the level of permanent income to be identical for all consumers (‘the
revolution’):
Pi,41 = GP40 (167)
and we redistribute cash among consumers in such a way as to leave each consumer
with the same value of mi,41 that they would have had in the absence of the revolution.
The purpose of this experiment is to wipe out the inherited covariance between P and
m in order to gauge the importance of the covariance eﬀect and the dynamic eﬀects
of that term on aggregate growth.








Figure 5: Consumption Growth in Simulated Economy with G = 1.03
The eﬀect of the revolution on consumption growth is small, and dissipates almost
immediately. This simulation and others suggest that the practical eﬀects of the co-
variance between m and P are likely to be negligible, so that we should expect that in
35buﬀer stock economies aggregate consumption growth will be very close to aggregate
permanent income growth.
5 Conclusions
This paper provides theoretical foundations necessary to prove many characteristics of
buﬀer stock saving models that have heretofore been observed in simulations but not
proven. The main results apply either to a model without liquidity constraints, or to
the model with constraints (e.g. Deaton (1991)) considered as a limiting case. Perhaps
the most important such proposition is the existence of a target cash-to-income ratio
toward which actual cash will tend.
Another contribution of the paper is that it provides a set of tools for simulation
analysis (available on the author’s web page) that conﬁrm and illustrate the theoretical
propositions. These programs demonstrate how the incorporation of the theoretical
results can make numerical solution algorithms more eﬃcient and simpler. The simu-
lation programs also provide quantiﬁcation of the qualitative properties derived ana-
lytically (what is the target level of the buﬀer stock? what is the population-average
marginal propensity to consume? etc.). Much previous work in the consumption liter-
ature has been either purely theoretical or purely simulation-based. This paper aims
to bridge that gap.
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38Appendices
A ct(m) Is Twice Continuously Diﬀerentiable
























Since ct and at are continuous and increasing, lim
dm→+0
u0(ct(y))−u0(ct(m))












at(y)−at(m) < 0 for suﬃciently small dx.














This implies that the right-derivative, c
0+








Similarly we can show that c
0+
t (m) = c
0−
t (m), which means c0
t(m) exists. Since vt
is C3, c0
t(m) exists and is continuous. c0
t(m) is diﬀerentiable because v00
t is C1, ct(m) is
C1 and u00(ct(m)) + v00
t (at(m)) < 0. c00
















t(at(m)) is continuous, c00
t(m) is also continuous.
B Convergence of vt in Euclidian Space
Boyd’s theorem shows that T deﬁnes a contraction mapping in a φ-bounded space.
We now show that T also deﬁnes a contraction mapping in Euclidian space.
Since v∗(m) = Tv∗(m),
kvT−n+1(m) − v
∗(m)kφ ≤ ς
n−1 kvT(m) − v
∗(m)kφ (169)
39On the other hand, vT − v∗ ∈ Cφ (A,B) and κ = kvT(m) − v∗(m)kφ < ∞ because vT









Since vT(m) = m1−ρ
1−ρ , vT−1(m) ≤
(¯ ¯ κm)1−ρ
1−ρ < vT(m). On the other hand, vT−1 ≤
vT means TvT−1 ≤ TvT, in other words, vT−2(m) ≤ vT−1(m). Inductively one gets
vT−n(m) ≥ vT−n−1(m). This means that {vT−n+1(m)}
∞
n=1 is a decreasing sequence.
C Convergence of ct
Given the proof that the value functions converge, we now show the pointwise conver-
gence of consumption functions {cT−n+1(m)}
∞
n=1.











is uniquely determined. We show this by contradiction. Suppose there exist c1 and c2
that both attain the supremum for some m, with mean ˇ c = (c1 + c2)/2. ci satisﬁes







where mt+1(m,c) = Rt+1(m−c)+ξt+1 and i = 1,2. Tv is concave for concave v. Since


















On the other hand,
1
2 {u(c1) + u(c2)} < u(ˇ c). Then one gets







Since ˇ c is a feasible choice for cj, v(ˇ c) is not a maximum, which contradicts the
deﬁnition.
Using uniqueness of c(m) we can now show
lim
n→∞cT−n+1(m) = c(m). (176)
40Suppose this does not hold for some m = m∗. In this case, {cT−n+1(m∗)}
∞





i=1 that satisﬁes limi→∞cT−n(i)(m∗) = c∗ and c∗ 6= c(m∗). Now
deﬁne c∗
T−n+1 = cT−n+1(m∗). c∗ > 0 because limi→∞ vT−n(i)+1(m∗) ≤ limi→∞ u(c∗
T−n(i)).
Because a(m∗) > 0 and Ψ ∈ [Ψ, ¯ Ψ] there exist {m∗
+, ¯ m∗
+} satisfying 0 < m∗









. It follows that limn→∞ vT−n+1(m) = v(m) and






. (Uniform convergence is obtained from


















for all n ≥ n1. It follows that if we deﬁne
w(m


















￿ = 0. (178)









￿ ≤ δ for all i ≥ i1 (179)


































￿ = 0 (181)
From (178) and (181), we obtain limi→∞ vT−n(i)(m∗) = w(m∗,c∗) and this implies
w(m∗,c∗) = v(m∗). This implies that c(m) is not uniquely determined, which is a
contradiction.
Thus, the consumption functions must converge.
D Et[(Rβ)1/ρ/˜ Γt+1] < 1
If Ψt+1 were distributed lognormally with no bounds, we would have that
logΨ
−ρ







17[Dini’s theorem] For a monotone sequence of continuous functions {vn(m)}
∞
n=1 which is deﬁned






































ψ/2 < 1 (188)
Et[(Rβ)
1/ρ/˜ Γt+1] < 1 (189)
where the last line follows under the maintained assumption ρ > 1.
We have assumed Ψ is distributed as a truncated lognormal; clearly if we specify
the truncation points [Ψ, ¯ Ψ] suﬃciently widely (189) will hold. We therefore assume
that the truncation points are suﬃciently wide.
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